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Summary.
- To alleviate the problems caused by the brain drain, Professor Bhagwati proposes
that professional,
technical, and kindred persons who emigrate from less developed countries be
subjected to a special tax on the income they earn in developed countries. This paper highlights
the political and legal issues raised by his proposal and examines three approaches
to implementation:
a tax levied by the less developed
country,
a tax levied by the developed country,
and a tax levied by the United Nations. Specific aspects of the proposal which require further
study and refinement,
such as administrative
feasibility, are outlined.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Appraisal of the problem
Skilled
manpower
is a key ingredient
of
economic
development.
For a number of years,
however, many less developed countries (LDCs)
have experienced
what is popularly
known as a
‘brain
drain’-the
emigration
of their most
talented
individuals
to the developed
countries
(DCs). The emigration
is due in part to the
higher salaries prevailing in the DCs. An LDC
that is unwilling or unable to offer comparable
salaries will often lose essential
professional,
leadership,
and entrepreneurial
abilities. Other
problems
occur even if the LDC is able to
compete
with the salaries offered in the international
market.
Although
more professionals
are induced
to stay at home, their relatively
high salaries create harsh income inequalities
and social strain within the LDC.
In response
to these problems,
Professor
Jagdish Bhagwati of MIT has suggested taxing
the earnings1 of professionals,
technicians,
and
kindred persons (PTKs) who emigrate to DCs.
The tax would have a number
of objectives.

First,
by effectively
reducing
the existing
salaries for PTKs in the international
market,
the tax would allow the LDC to pay its resident
PTK a wage that was more consistent
with the
social objectives
of the country.
The trend
toward increased income inequality
might then
be partially
averted. Second, the revenue from
the tax would help compensate
the LDC for the
burdens imposed by emigration.
Third, the tax
would enable the LDC to share in the improved
incomes of its emigrants.
Finally, by reducing

* The authors wish to express their sincere appreciation to Michael J. McIntyre,
Director of Training,
International
Tax Program,
Harvard Law School, for
his critical insights in reviewing an earlier draft of this
paper.
1. Although
our analysis
is concerned
with the
taxation
of earned
income,
our conclusions
are
generally
applicable
to the taxation
of unearned
income.
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the economic
returns to emigration,
the tax
might discourage the loss of manpower.*
In order
to accomplish
these objectives,
Bhagwati
proposes
that the host DC levy a
special tax on the earnings of immigrant PTKs.
The DC would then remit the proceeds of the
tax to the
LDC of origin.
Alternatively,
Bhagwati suggests that the tax on PTK earnings
be levied by the United Nations, with the proceeds either remitted
to the LDC of origin or
earmarked
for general developmental
aid to the
LDCs.
Imposing
a tax on PTKs to alleviate the
losses caused by the brain drain raises fundamental moral and political questions
about the
individual’s
relationship
to society
and his
rights of self-realization
and fulfilment.3
The
crux of the problem lies in balancing the legitimate interests of society against the interests of
the individual.
Given the disparate
economic,
cultural,
and perhaps
political perspectives
of
the DCs and the LDCs, opinions will differ on
how the balance should be struck.
The DCs will tend to strike the balance on
the side of the PTK and will react negatively if
the tax has a serious impact on emigration.
Moreover, even if the impact is negligible, some
will find the tax offensive if the PTKs’ primary
motive for leaving the LDC were to escape
political
or religious oppression.
The fairness
and justice in placing financial responsibility
for
aiding the LDCs on the shoulders of the PTKs
will also be questioned,
especially if emigration
was the result of a lack of professional
opportunities
in the LDC. Indeed,
comparing
the
immigrant
PTK with citizens of the DC, some
may argue that instead of paying a tax, the PTK
deserves to be compensated
for the hardships
and cultural deprivation
he endured
while in
the LDC.
The LDCs, by comparison,
will strike the
balance on the side of society. Mitigating the
harsh economic conditions
in the LDC will take
priority
over the desires of individuals.
The
PTK will thus be seen as having an obligation to
contribute
to his country’s development.
If the
salary and the standard of living enjoyed by the
PTK in the DC are compared with conditions
in
the LDC, the emigrant PTK will appear to have
the capacity to bear an additional
tax burden.
Furthermore,
the LDCs will urge that the DCs
have not only an obligation
but also the
capability
necessary
to administer
any tax
designed to impose that burden.
Since no simple means of resolving
these
issues exists, the Bhagwati proposal should be
structured
so that it minimizes the differences
in perspective
between the LDCs and the DCs.

At the least, the rate of tax should be low
enough so that it does not materially affect the
individual’s decision to emigrate. Subject to this
caveat, two alternatives
seem realistic. In view
of the sensitive issues of human rights involved
-rights
that may be guaranteed
under international law”-one
alternative
would be for the
United Nations to design and administer
the
tax. Reaching a consensus among the members
of the United
Nations
with respect
to the
implementation
of the tax might be difficult,
however.
A second alternative
would be to conform
the Bhagwati proposal as closely as possible to
existing
patterns
of taxation.
Under
this
approach,
the LDC would tax the foreign earnings of all its non-resident
citizens, rather than
singling out PTKs for special treatment.
As long
as the PTK remained a citizen of the LDC, he
would
automatically
fall within
the LDC’s
jurisdiction.
In taxing the earnings of all of its
non-resident
citizens, the LDC would be adopting an approach
already used by the United
States, Mexico, and the Philippines.
An LDC tax on the foreign earnings of all
non-resident
citizens may not be practicable
for
very many LDCs because of enforcement
problems. Nonetheless,
we have chosen this alternative as the focus of our paper because dis-

2. The restrictions that each DC imposes on entry
may already reduce immigration to a level below what
would exist in the absence of all controls. Thus, the
tax could affect only the size of the waiting list (i.e.,
the excess demand) for entry into the DC, and not the
actual level of immigration.
The effect of the tax on
immigration
levels must be distinguished,
however,
from the effect of the tax on an individual’s decision
to emigrate. A reduction
in the size of the waiting lists
would indicate that the tax has deterred some individuals from attempting
to emigrate.
3. To be sure, the immigration
restrictions
of the
DCs may raise similar philosophical
problems. Emigration and immigration
restrictions
do differ, however,
in at least one important
way. Since immigration
restrictions
vary from country
to country,
an individual may be prevented
from entering the DC of his
preference,
but he will no doubt be able to obtain
entry to some other DC. That option would obviously
be precluded
if the tax were an obstacle to leaving the
LDC at all.
4. For a discussion of the possible conflicts between
the Bhagwati
proposal
and rights guaranteed
under
international
law, see Frank Newman, ‘The brain drain
tax and international
human rights law’, paper presented at the Bellagio Conference,
15-19
February
1975, and to appear in the volume edited by Bhagwati
and Partington,
Taxing the Brain Drain: A Proposal.
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cussion of an LDC tax will highlight many of
the legal and administrative
issues underlying
the Bhagwati
proposal.
An understanding
of
these issues is necessary to evaluate competing
proposals
and to provide
a foundation
for
further discussion.
Many of the legal and administrative
issues
raised by the Bhagwati proposal
are complex
and involve
matters
of dispute
among
tax
specialists. Because of the varied backgrounds
of
the conferees,
we will not attempt
to present
the debates in detail, but rather only a broad
outline of the major issues. We will concentrate
on the
refinements
needed
to make
the
Bhagwati
proposal
feasible and acceptable
in
view of general notions
of international
tax
equity.
Given the theme of this conference,
we will
also explore
briefly
other tax measures
for
transferring
resources
to
the
LDCs.
For
example,
PTKs could be encouraged,
rather
than compelled,
to make contributions
to the
LDCs through
the
use of tax incentives.
Another
approach
would be for the United
Nations to assess the host DCs, rather than the
PTKs, and remit the proceeds
to the LDCs.
Though
these
other
approaches
might not
accomplish
all of Bhagwati’s
goals, one or a
combination
of them could prove ultimately
to
be the most politically
acceptable
response to
the brain drain.
B. International
income trix rules
Many of the legal issues raised by a tax on
emigrant PTKs are jurisdictional
in nature. That
is, they involve the rules governing the extent
of a country’s
taxing powers. Countries
have
generally
exercised
self-restraint
in asserting
their
tax jurisdiction.
The practicalities
of
enforcement
and the fear that a broad assertion
of jurisdiction
might offend
foreign governments have kept countries from exercising their
taxing
powers
in ways that
would
create
conflicts among countries.
Accordingly,
rules of
tax jurisdiction
exist in the sense that certain
patterns
of taxation
are acceptable
as a matter
of international
custom.
No international
law
exists, however,
defining the outer limits of a
country’s tax jurisdicti0n.s
In order effectively
to assert jurisdiction
to
a country
must rely on some
tax income,
minimum
connection
or nexus between
itself
and the taxpayer
or between
itself and the
income being taxed.6 In terms of the nature of
this nexus, tax systems can be classified into
two major groups: schedular systems and global
or unitary
systems.
Under a pure schedular
system,
the jurisdictional
connection
is the
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source
of the income.7
Only income
from
domestic
sources is taxed;a
no jurisdiction
is
asserted
over income
from foreign
sources.
Since all countries
tax income from domestic
sources,
any country
that uses a schedular
system-that
taxes
only
domestic
incomeexercises the most limited form of tax jurisdiction.
In a global system,
an additional
jurisdictional connection
is the personal status of the
taxpayer.
Jurisdiction
is thus based on two
independent
factors:
the source of the income
and the status of the taxpayer.
Under most
global systems,
residence
is the connection
relied
on in asserting
tax jurisdiction
over
individuals.
In a few countries,
including
the
United
States,
Mexico,
and the Philippines,
citizenship
alone is a sufficient
connection.9
These countries,
however, also tax non-citizens
who are residents.
That is, either
statuscitizenship
or residence-is
sufficient
for the
assertion
of tax jurisdiction,
though
the vast
majority
of taxpayers
are both citizens
and
residents.
Countries
using a global system tax
all income
of their citizens
and residents,
regardless
o,f its geographical
source. In other
words, income from foreign sources is taxed
along with domestic income.
The
difference
between
taxing
on
a
residence basis and taxing on a citizenship
basis
can be illustrated
by considering
taxpayer
A,
who is a citizen of country X. Assume A moves
abroad and is no longer considered
by X to be a
resident. If X taxes on the basis of citizenship,
5. Compare Matin Non, ‘Jurisdiction to tax and
international
income’, Tax Law Review, Vol. 17
(1962) p. 431, with Stanford Ross, ‘United States
taxation of aliens and foreign corporations:
the
Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966 and related
developments’, Tax Law Review, Vol. 22 (1967)
p. 363.
6. Norr, op. cit., p. 432.
7. ibid., p. 434.
8. Different types of domestic income may be taxed
in different ways. See, generally, ‘Schedular and global
income taxes’, in Richard M. Bird and Oliver Oldman
(eds.), Readings on Taxation in Developing Countries
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, rev. ed. 1967).
p. 132. The personal status of the taxpayer may be
relevant in determining the rate applied to the income.
9. See, generally,
Douglas Sherbaniuk,
Henry
Hutcheon, and Pearley. Brissenden, ‘Liability for taxresidence, domicile or citizenship?‘, in Canadian Tax
Foundation, Report of Proceedings of the Seventeenth
Annual Tax Conference (Toronto, 1964) p. 315.
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A’s change of residence will be irrelevant and X
will tax A not only on income earned within X,
but also on any income
earned abroad.
By
comparison,
if X taxes only on the basis of
residence,
it will no longer assert jurisdiction
over A on the basis of his personal status. Thus
X will not tax A on income earned abroad. X
will tax A, however,
on income received from
sources within X. In this case, the source of the
income
is a sufficient
connection
with the
country
to warrant
the assertion
of its tax
jurisdiction.
Most
income
tax
systems
are hybrids,
employing
some combination
of the global and
schedular concepts.
For example, a global-type
system might tax foreign income differently
from domestic
income. To this extent, foreign
income would receive schedular
treatment.
A
global system is probably
used more often by
the DCs, a schedular system more often by the
LDCs. The trend,
however,
in the LDCs is
toward use of the global approach.

II. APPROACHES
TO THE TAXATION
OF EMIGRANT PTKs
This section analyses three basic approaches
to the taxation
of emigrant
PTKs. Part A
considers the problems
raised in the extension
of an LDC’s tax jurisdiction
to reach the earnings of emigrant
PTKs. In Part B, Bhagwati’s
proposal of a DC tax is treated by examining
the case of the United States. The use of a
deduction
for charitable
contributions
is also
discussed
as an alternative
measure.
Part C
explores
two approaches
the United Nations
can adopt: a tax on PTKs and an assessment on
host DCs based
on the benefits
they have
received from the immigration
of PTKs.
A. LDC taxation

of emigrant

PTKs

1. Jurisdictional
issues. In order to tax the
income earned abroad by an emigrant PTK, the
LDC must assert jurisdiction
on the basis of the
personal status of the PTK. If the LDC relies on
residence as its jurisdictional
nexus, as do most
global-type
countries,
the jurisdictional
issue
involved in taxing the PTK is the definition
of
‘resident’.
The definition
of ‘resident’ varies markedly
from
country
to country.
Some countries
follow specific rules that define residence
in
terms of the period of time a person has been
within or without the country. Other countries

decide the question on an almost ad hoc basis,
with little guidance
from statutes.
Often,
a
combination
of
the
two
approaches
is
adopted.10
Whatever the approach,
the basic question
is: at what point does a PTK working abroad
cease being a resident of the LDC? The factors
that most countries
would consider
are the
intent of the PTK with respect to his being
abroad, the length of his stay abroad, and the
nature of his contacts with both countries. For
example,
a PTK who was sent abroad by his
employer
for short-term
training would clearly
remain a resident of the LDC. In contrast,
the
PTKs whom the Bhagwati proposal is intended
to reach-those
who have emigrated abroad-are
the least likely to fall within the usual concepts
of residence.
In order to assert jurisdiction
over emigrant
PTKs, the LDC has two options. The first is to
define residence
in terms of a person’s prior
contacts
with the LDC, even though all these
contacts
may have been severed long ago. This
definition
of residence
would be broader than
that
so far adopted
by any country.
As
explained in Section I(B) such a broad assertion
of jurisdiction
could not be said to violate international law, but because it would be out of the
mainstream
of
international
custom
and
practice,
two serious
problems
could arise.
First, the DC might refuse to recognize
the
LDC’s definition,
especially since it would conflict with the DC’s claim of residence over the
PTK. A DC that viewed the LDC’s assertion of
jurisdiction
as illegitimate
would obviously not
co-operate
with the LDC in policing the tax on
PTKs. Second, the LDC’s claim of residence
would make little sense to a PTK who had cut
all his ties with the LDC. He might therefore
ignore the claim and refuse to comply voluntarily with the tax.
The second option is for the LDC to follow
the pattern
established
by the United States,
and the Philippines,
and assert tax
Mexico,

10. For illustrations of the approaches some countries
use, see Harvard Law School, International
Tax Program, World Tax Series (hereinafter
WTS): Taxation in
Australia (Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1958) 5/l;
WTS, Taxation in the Federal Republic of Germany
(Chicago: Commerce
Clearing House, Inc., 1963) 2/2;
WTS, Taxation in Sweden (Boston:
Little, Brown &
Co., 1959) 5/l. The definition
of resident
mav be
different
for citizens or nationals than for aliens: See
WTS, Twation in Colombia (Chicago:
Commerce
Clearing House, Inc., 1964) 11/1.2.
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jurisdiction
on the basis of citizenship. 11 Since
these three countries
apply citizenship
jurisdiction uniformly
to all citizens, the LDC could
not limit citizenship
jurisdiction
to PTKs without encountering
serious
problems.
As discussed
in Section
I(A) the singling out of
emigrant
PTKs for special treatment
would
raise delicate political and moral problems
and
may violate certain human rights guaranteed
under international
law.12 These problems, like
those arising from an unorthodox
definition
of
residence,13
would be obstacles
to obtaining
the administrative
assistance of the DCs and to
obtaining
the voluntary
compliance
of the
PTKs.
Other reasons exist for the LDC not to limit
its citizenship
jurisdiction
to PTKs. By bringing
all non-resident
citizens into its tax net, an LDC
could broaden its tax base. 14 With a larger tax
base, the LDC could lower its tax rate on
foreign income and still raise as much revenue
as it would by applying a higher rate to just the
earnings of PTKs. Keeping the tax rate low has
two major advantages.
First, the emigrant PTK
is not likely to engage in tax avoidance
or
evasion if the amount
of tax at stake is not
large. Second, the PTK’s decision to emigrate is
unlikely
to be affected
by a low rate; thus
conflict
with basic individual
rights can be
avoided.
If all non-resident
citizens are brought into
the tax net,1 5 the LDC need not define who is
a PTK for tax purposes.
Any attempt to define
a PTK would involve drawing fine distinctions,
and considerable
strain would be placed on the
definition
by manoeuvres
to circumvent
it. Any
weakness in the definition
would operate to the
advantage of the taxpayer.
2. Renunciation
of citizenship
by the PTK.
The LDC’s assertion of jurisdiction
on the basis
of citizenship
might induce a PTK to renounce
his citizenship
in order to avoid LDC taxation.
Though one result would be a revenue loss to
the LDC, another,
more important,
consequence would be a lowering of the probability
that the PTK would eventually
return to the
LDC. Imposing
an income tax on non-resident
citizens
might therefore
not be in the LDC’s
best interests
to the extent that it resulted in
wholesale renunciations
of citizenship.
Could the LDC ignore a PTK’s renunciation
of citizenship,
at least for the purpose of asserting tax jurisdiction?
Again, international
law
offers
little guidance
since no country
has
attempted
such
a broad
assertion
of tax
jurisdiction.16
It may, however,
be useful to
distinguish
two
situations.
A PTK
who
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renounces
his LDC citizenship
can either
acquire a new citizenship
or else become stateless. The LDC’s assertion
of tax jurisdiction
over the PTK once he has acquired citizenship
in the DC would raise the same problems as an
unorthodox
definition
of residence. In contrast,
an LDC policy that discouraged
persons from
becoming
stateless
in order to avoid taxation
would seem reasonable.17
Thus one approach
the LDC could adopt would be to recognize the

11. In some countries, the taxation of the foreign
earnings of a non-resident
citizen may conflict with
constitutional
doctrines
proscribing
legislation having
an extraterritorial
effect. For example, some Canadian
constitutional-law
scholars felt that, prior to 1931,
Canada was precluded from enacting legislation having
an extraterritorial
effect. In 1931, the Canadian Parliament, passed
the Statute
of’ Westminster,
which
expressly
authorized
such legislation.
The Statute of
Westminster
clearly established
the power to tax nonresident
citizens
on their foreign
income,
though
Canada
has never chosen
to exercise
this power.
Sherbaniuk,
Hutcheon,
and Brissenden,
op. cit., p.
316.
12. The LDC’s domestic
law may also prevent
singling out of PTKs for special tax treatment.

the

13. An assertion
of citizenship
jurisdiction
by the
LDC might
also be viewed as creating
a conflict
between the two countries.
The short answer is that
countries
accept certain conflicts
as being legitimate
and inevitable.
The
conflict
between
citizenship
jurisdiction
and residence jurisdiction
is, by custom
considered
acceptable.
The conflict
and practice,
created
by a deviant
definition
of resident
would,
however, be considered illegitimate.
14. The extent
to which
the tax
broadened
depends
on how narrow
PTK an LDC contemplated.

base could
a definition

be
of

15. In some LDCs. e.g., Britain’s former colonies in
Africa, the brain drain may consist of PTKs who are
not citizens of the LDC. The assertion of citizenship
jurisdiction
would obviously not reach this group.
16. The United States has a provision
designed
to
discourage citizens from giving up their citizenship and
moving abroad
in order to avoid US tax. Internal
Revenue
Code of 1954,
5 877. The special tax
imposed
on expatriates
extends
only to their US
investment
income and income effectively
connected
with the conduct
of a trade or business within the
United States. No attempt is made to tax their foreign
earnings
that have no connection
with the United
States.
17. Statelessness
is frowned upon in international
law.
See Paul Weis, ‘The United Nations Convention
on the
Reduction
of Statelessness,
1961’, International and
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 11 (1962) p. 1073.
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renunciation
of citizenship
only if he
obtained
a new citizenship.rs
In the case of a
PTK who had emigrated
to the United States,
the LDC could levy its tax for at least five
years, which is the length of time an immigrant
must normally
wait before
applying
for US
citizenship. 19
If the LDC asserts tax jurisdiction
over the
PTK during his first five years in the United
States, the PTK would have nothing
to gain
from renouncing
his LDC citizenship.
From the
LDC’s point of view, however, limiting taxation
to a five-year
period
may reduce
potential
revenues. The PTK’s early years in a DC might
not
be productive
in terms
of income,
especially
if he spends part of the time in
school. Furthermore,
the PTK may be able to
reduce his income during this period by working under a deferred compensation
agreement.
Devising rules to minimize
tax avoidance
through renunciation
of citizenship
is difficult,
and no one solution appears to be completely
satisfactory.
The problem
of wholesale
renunciations may, however, be larger in theory than
in fact. An LDC tax that imposes only a modest
burden on the PTK is not likely to result in
renunciation.
Renunciation
would also be unattractive
to
a PTK whose
close
family
members remained in the LDC with no thought
of emigrating
or to a PTK who was uncertain
about his future plans. Moreover, cultural and
social patterns
are likely to influence
a PTK’s
decision;
the strength
of his ties to the LDC
may outweigh
the tax savings from renunciation.
PTK’s

3. Relieffrom
double taxation. International
double taxation
can result when a taxpayer or
his income has jurisdictional
connections
with
more than one country.
Since a DC will tax a
PTK on income earned within the DC, double
taxation
will occur if the LDC also taxes the
PTK.
Suppose
a PTK has taxable
income
of
$20,000
derived
entirely
from employment
within the United States. Assume that the US
tax would be levied at an effective rate of 25
per cent, resulting
in a US tax liability
of
$5,000. If the LDC levies its regular income tax
on the same base,*0 $20,000, at an effective
rate of 45 per cent, the LDC tax liability would
be $9,000. The total tax burden on the PTK’s
earnings would be $14,000 ($5,000+
$9,000),
for an over-all effective rate of 70 per cent.
As the example
illustrates,
the burden
of
double
taxation
can be quite onerous.
Most
countries that tax foreign income therefore use
some type of credit mechanism
to provide

relief.2 1 In its simplest form, such a mechanism
would require the taxpayer to compute his tax
liability and then take as a credit against that
liability the amount of any foreign tax paid on
the income.**
The PTK in the example would
take a credit for the US tax of $5,000, thereby
lowering his LDC tax liability from $9,000 to
$4,000. From the US point of view, the PTK
has no foreign income and thus cannot take a
credit against his US tax liability.
The final
result is that the PTK pays tax to the United
States at a rate of 25 per cent and to the LDC
at a rate of 20 per cent.
In short, as long as long as the LDC tax rate
is higher than the US rate, the credit results in
tax being paid to the LDC at a rate equal to the
excess of the effective LDC rate over the effective US rate (the 20 per cent final result in the
example).
As long as the PTK’s earnings are
high by LDC standards,
the effective LDC tax
rate will probably
exceed the effective US rate,
and the LDC will therefore
receive some tax
revenue from the PTK. Should the US rate be
higher than the LDC rate, however, the credit
for taxes paid to the United States will exceed
and thus cancel the LDC tax liability. If the
rates in the example
were reversed, the PTK
would pay $9,000 in US tax, and credit this
foreign tax against his LDC liability
of $5,000.
Under
receive

these
no tax

circumstances,
revenue
from

the

the
LDC
PTK.

would

18. Such an approach
would be similar to the US
common-law
rule that a person does not lose one
domicile until he has acquired another.
19. Under certain
American citizen),
live years.

conditions
the waiting

(e.g., marriage
to an
period may be less than

20. The LDC will determine
the PTK’s taxable
income according
to its own definition.
The LDC’s
determination
of the PTK’s taxable income does not
have to correspond
with that of the United States.
21. Among the countries using the credit method are
Canada, Greece, India, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan,
the Philippines,
Turkey,
the United
Kingdom,
the
United States, and West Germany.
Other countries
may agree to grant a credit for taxes paid to countries
with which they have tax treaties. The United States,
for example, requires its tax treaty partners to grant a
credit to their residents for income tax paid to the
United
States.
Elisabeth
Owens,
The Foreign Tax
Credit (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Law School, International Tax Program, 1961) p. 20, n.30.
22. For an in-depth
analysis
credit, see Owens, op. cit.

of the US foreign

tax
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If the goal of the LDC is to maximize
its
revenue, it should not allow a credit for foreign
taxes. Moreover,
no principle
of international
law requires
a country
to provide relief from
the burden of double taxation.23
Indeed, if an
LDC wanted to increase the economic
cost of
the PTK’s decision
to work abroad, it would
adopt no relief provisions whatsoever.
The lack
of relief provisions may be counterproductive
in
a revenue
sense, however,
because
it would
encourage
the PTK to evade or avoid the LDC
tax.
In deciding whether
or not to adopt some
method
of relief, the LDC must consider the
attitude
of the host DC, especially if the LDC
will need assistance
from the DC in enforcing
its tax. The United States, Canada, the United
Kingdom,
and West Germany,
all of which use
the foreign tax credit as a means of relief, are
not likely to help enforce an LDC tax whose
burden
they
deem
excessive.
Furthermore,
without some relief mechanism,
the over-all tax
burden on PTK earnings would be high enough
in most cases to deter the PTK from emigrating.
If the DCs are sensitive to the effect of the LDC
tax on emigration,
the LDC would have to be
willing to adopt some method
of relief as a
precondition
to requesting
the DC’s administrative assistance.
The credit mechanism
eliminates
only the
burden resulting from double taxation.
As the
effective LDC rate in the example (45 per cent)
indicates,
the PTK’s income in the DC makes
him appear quite affluent by LDC standards. A
salary that is considered
to be no more than
adequate
by US standards
may well thrust the
PTK into the LDC’s upper tax brackets.
An
LDC income tax that would be appropriate
if
the PTK were living in the LDC could border
on being confiscatory
when measured
against
the cost of living in the DC. Thus the relief
afforded by the credit mechanism
might not be
sufficient.
Instead,
the LDC might consider
adopting
a special tax for foreign income (see
Part A (5) below).

will have had no experience
in taxing foreign
income.
Furthermore,
the reason the country
uses a schedular-type
system and taxes only
domestic
income may be that its tax administration is not capable of administering
a global
system.24
An LDC using a global-type
system,
however,
will have had some experience
in
taxing
the foreign
income
of its residents.
Despite
this experience,
an LDC will find it
harder to enforce a tax on the foreign income
of emigrant PTKs than on that of residents.
The willingness of PTKs to comply with the
tax laws of their LDCs will depend on the
loyalties that they feel. PTKs may constitute
a
most recalcitrant
group of taxpayers:
not only
may they fail to see the justice in a tax burden
that exceeds that of their colleagues in the DC,
but they may also have no intention
of contributing to the costs of a government
with whose
pohcies they disagree. Secure in the belief that
the LDC does not have easy access to their
financial
affairs in the DC, PTKs may feel
confident
to file a tax return containing
false
information.
Indeed, a PTK who has cut,all ties
with his LDC may see no need to file a return
at all.25 Obtaining accurate information
about
a PTK’s taxable income is the first problem an
LDC faces in administering
a tax on nonresidents.
Once the PTK’s tax liability has been
determined,
the second problem lies in collecting the amount owed.
In order to obtain the information
necessary
to assess a recalcitrant
PTK, the LDC may
engage in some form of unilateral
action. For
example, an LDC tax administrator
could go to
the DC and conduct his own investigation.
This
approach is obviously expensive;
moreover, the
DC may regard the tax administrator’s
presence
as an intrusion
on its national sovereignty.
For
these reasons,
unilateral
action is rarely used
unless large amounts of revenue are involved.26
A more
effective
and
less
expensive
approach
open to the LDC is to enlist the
co-operation
of the DC’s tax administration.
If
the desired information
is not already available,

4. Administrative
considerations.
Policing a
tax on non-resident
citizens creates problems
even for a sophisticated
tax administration
such
as that of the United States. Since many LDCs
are inefficient
tax collectors
in the domestic
situation,
the assertion of citizenship
jurisdiction over non-residents
may cause severe enforcement
problems.
In countries
plagued by
low taxpayer morality and lacking experience
in
the taxation
of foreign income, the problems
will be compounded.
An LDC using a pure schedular-type
system

23. Non, op. cit., p. 438.
24. In some countries, the existence of a schedular
system reflects the Political reality that those in power
have substantial amounts of foreign income.
25. The failure to receive returns from taxpayers
abroad is a problem that plagues all countries. See
John Surr, ‘Intertax:
intergovernmental
co-operation
in taxation’,
Harvard International Law Club Journal,
Vol. 7 (1966) p. 203.
26. ibid., p. 182.
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it will be easier for the DC’s tax administration
to make the appropriate
investigation
than for
the LDC’s. Furthermore,
the PTK’s knowledge
that the LDC can readily obtain information
about his financial situation will encourage him
to comply with the tax laws of the LDC by
filing an accurate return in the first place.
The United States does not exchange
tax
information
on an informal basis. Information
is exchanged
only under conditions
specified in
a tax treaty. The actual information
exchanged
varies from treaty
to treaty.
Certain readily
available information,
such as a list of foreign
taxpayers
receiving
investment
income
from
which US taxes have been withheld,
may be
routinely
exchanged,
especially if such information has already
been compiled
for US tax
purposes.
Non-routine
information,
for
example,
information
on a specific taxpayer,
must be specially requested by a foreign government and usually
will be supplied
only in
certain limited circumstances.
In practice,
the
number of individuals about whom information
is exchanged is not large.27
At the least, the LDC would want information from the United
States on the income
earned by any PTK who has failed to file a
return. Ideally, the LDC would also want corroborative
information
on PTKs who have filed
returns.
Although
compiling
this information
would
be feasible,
it would far exceed the
current US practice.
Once
the PTK’s tax liability
has been
assessed, the LDC is faced with the problem of
collecting the tax owed. The problem is simplified if the PTK has assets within the LDC which
may be liquidated
to satisfy his tax debt. Such
assets would also provide the means of enforcing a penalty imposed on a PTK for failure to
file a return.
If the PTK has removed all his
assets to the DC,*s the LDC has four options.
It may (1) ignore the tax owed until the PTK
returns,
if ever; (2) use non-tax
measures
as
leverage to encourage
payment
of the tax; (3)
collect the tax through the DC’s courts; or (4)
ask the DC for administrative
assistance.
The first option provides the PTK with an
obvious disincentive
to return to the LDC. Even
if the PTK were to return, his accumulated
tax
bill might outstrip his financial resources.
This
option also has the disadvantage
of putting the
PTK in the position of being able to negotiate
for a lower tax liability as a condition
of his
returning.
The effectiveness
of the second
option
depends
on what measures for applying pressure on the PTK are available to the LDC. For
example, the PTK may have to ask the LDC to

renew his passport or his medical or engineering
licence, and the LDC can refuse to co-operate
unless
the
PTK’s
tax
liability
has been
satisfied.29
Certainly not every PTK will have
the occasion to seek assistance from his LDC of
origin, but should such an occasion arise, a PTK
may not be willing to relinquish his passport or
professional
licence.
The third option may not be available to all
DCs. The British, Canadian,30
and American
courts, for example, will not recognize a foreign
tax judgement,
apparently
on the theory that a
tax is an assertion
of a foreign
country’s
sovereignty
which another independent
country
should not tolerate within its borders. A similar
argument
is sometimes
made that taxes are
closely
connected
with
public
policy
and
foreign relations;
by ruling on the validity of
foreign taxes, the judiciary might embarrass its
own country or the foreign country. 3 1
The fourth option, engaging the assistance of
the DC’s tax administration,
is the most effective one. Since the DC has jurisdiction
both
over the PTK and over his assets within the DC,
27. See Elisabeth Owens, ‘United States income tax
treaties: their role in relieving double taxation’,
Rutgers Law Review, Vol. 17 (1963) p. 450.
28. Property of the FTK may reenter the LDC at a
later date. For example, the F’TK may send to relatives
within the LDC cash or other property that can be
seized and credited against the tax liability.

29. Compare the Venezuelan use of certificates of
solvency; see Patrick Kelley and Oliver Oldman (eds.),
Readings on Income
Tax Administration
(Mineola,
NY: Foundation Press, 1973) pp. 510-15.
30. See, e.g., United States

of America

v. Harden, 41

DLR (2d) 721 (1963);
31. Surr, op. cit., p. 222. For criticism of this
doctrine, see Lawrence Robertson, ‘Extraterritorial
enforcement of tax obligations’, Arizona Law Review,
Vol. 7 (1966) p. 219.
Although the US courts will not enforce foreign
tax judgements, they will, under certain conditions,
enforce non-tax judgements. The US court must be
convinced (1) that the foreign court had proper
jurisdiction to issue the judgement; (2) that a fair trial
was conducted
under a system of jurisprudence
likely
to secure an impartial
administration
of justice; (3)
that the judgement
was not procured by fraud; and (4)
that the underlying
cause of action is not contrary to
the public policy of the United States. See American
Law Institute, Restatement
of the Law, Second: Conflict of Laws (St. Paul, Minn.: American Law Institute
Publishers,
1971) Q 98; see also Monrad Paulsen and
Michael Sovern, ‘ “Public Policy”
in the conflict of
laws’, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 56 (1956) p. 969.
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it is obviously in a position to bring to bear the
full weight of its own collection
machinery.
A
tax administration
that is asked to provide
collection
assistance
may either (1) refuse all
collection
assistance;
(2) provide some collection
assistance
informally;
or (3) agree to
undertake
collection
assistance
only in accordance with a formal commitment.
Many tax administrations
have refused to
engage
in intergovernmental
tax collection
assistance of any kind.32 A country that feels it
would
gain
very
little
through
such
cooperation
will not wish to expend its limited
administrative
personnel
in collecting taxes on
behalf
of a foreign
country.33
Other
tax
administrations
may,
under
certain
circumstances, informally
help another country collect
its taxes. If a PTK does not dispute the amount
of LDC tax assessed, a DC tax administration
might send him a letter demanding
that he pay
the amount
owed. This apparent
joining
of
forces by the LDC and the DC could be enough
to frighten
the taxpayer
into paying, even if
neither
the tax administration
nor the courts
were to take any action if the PTK ignored the
letter.
The United States does not engage in collection assistance on an informal basis. Any collection assistance offered by the United States-or,
for that matter,
by most Western European
countries-is
in pursuance
of a formal commitment
contained
in a tax treaty.34
Most
treaties
have explicit provisions
pledging each
country’s
assistance
to the other in the collection of taxes, but assistance is usually limited to
situations
in which taxpayers
wrongfully
seek
to obtain treaty benefits.35
The case of a PTK
who has failed to pay taxes to an LDC is not
such a situation.
Only one recent US treaty
provides
for assistance
under
more general
circumstances.
36
The use of collection
assistance agreements
is a relatively
undeveloped
area.37 Over and
above taxpayer
resistance
to such provisions,
which
is undoubtedly
an obstacle
to their
adoption,38
difficult policy questions
must also
be resolved.
For example,
under what conditions can one country refuse to assist the other
in the collection
of taxes? If an LDC levies a
tax only on non-residents
who are PTKs, and if
a similar tax would
be unconstitutional
if
enacted
by the United
States,
should
the
United
States nonetheless
provide
collection
assistance to the LDC? How can the taxpayer
be protected
against arbitrary
conduct
by the
taxing country? The lack of agreement on these
issues
has
hindered
intergovernmental
cooperation in the collection
of taxes.
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As this brief survey of existing
practices
indicates,
some precedent
does exist for international
co-operation
in the exchange
of tax
information
and, to a much lesser extent, in the
collection
of foreign taxes. The limited amount
of co-operation
now being offered,
however,
would clearly be inadequate
if more than just a
few PTKs failed to comply with the LDC tax
laws. Intergovernmental
co-operation
is thus no
substitute
for voluntary
compliance
by the
PTK.
Assuming a DC was willing to offer broader
assistance
than usual, it might not do so without the assurance that other DCs were similarly
inclined.
Otherwise,
any DC that was competing with other DCs for special types of PTKs
(e.g., doctors)
might fear that its enforcement
efforts would only divert immigration
to those
countries
not willing to offer the same assistance. Whether all the DCs could come to an
agreement
on the appropriate
amount of assistance is doubtful.

tax

5. Rates of an LDC tax. The amount of LDC
liability has a strong bearing on taxpayer

32. Surr, op. cit., p. 220.
33. This feeling was also echoed
sations between
Internal Revenue

the authors
Service.

in recent converand officials of the US

34. Historically,
the United States has not entered
into collection
assistance
agreements,
or exchange of
independently
of a tax
information
agreements,
treaty.
35. e.g., ‘[Elach
of the Contracting
States
shall
endeavour
to collect such taxes imposed by the other
Contracting
State as will ensure that any exemption
or
reduced rate of tax granted under this Convention
by
that other Contracting
State shall not be enjoyed by
persons
not entitled
to such benefits.’
Article 27,
United StatessJapan
Tax Treaty.
36. ‘The two Contracting
States undertake
to lend
assistance and support to each other in the collection
of the taxes to which the present Convention
relates
. . in cases where the taxes are definitely due according to the laws of the State making the application.’
Article 27, United States-France
Tax Treaty.
37. Officials
consulted
in the US Internal
Revenue
Service could not remember
any case in which the
Service collected
a tax on behalf of a foreign government. They stated repeatedly,
‘Let them fight their
own battles, we’re overworked
as it is’.
38. Owens,

The Foreign

Tax Credit, op. cit., p. 451.
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compliance,
as well as on many of the other
problems
discussed
above.
Although
some
emigrant
PTKs will not co-operate
with the
LDC under any circumstances,
the behaviour of
most will be influenced
by the size of the LDC
tax on their foreign earnings. If the burden of
the LDC tax is not unreasonable,
the PTK is
less likely to renounce
his LDC citizenship
or
use other means of evading or avoiding the tax.
Furthermore,
the DC is more likely to assist the
LDC in collecting
the tax if the rate is low
enough not to influence the PTK’s decision to
emigrate
or constitute
a hardship
while he is
living in the DC. Thus considerable
care must
be used in designing the rate structure
of an
LDC tax.
The LDC can choose among a number of
approaches
in setting tax rates for the PTK. It
can ignore the fact that the PTK is abroad and
apply its regular rate schedule
to the PTK’s
foreign earnings. In many cases, however, this
approach
will result in a tax burden that is
heavy by DC standards,
even if some relief is
provided
through
a credit
for DC taxes.39
Alternatively,
the LDC could adopt a flat rate
for foreign income or if an element of progressivity were desired,
a special progressive
rate
schedule could be designed for foreign income.
A rate schedule
appropriate
for one DC may
not be appropriate
for another
DC. A special
schedule
may therefore
have to be developed
for each DC.
A more satisfactory
approach
might be for
the LDC to levy a surtax on the amount of the
tax that the PTK pays to the host DC. In other
words, the LDC tax would be equal to a percentage
of the DC tax.40 One advantage
of
such a surtax is that it relates the additional tax
burden imposed
by the LDC to the DC tax.
Since the DC tax reflects what the DC regards
as a fair tax burden, the LDC has a convenient
means of assuring that the additional
burden
resulting from its tax will not be unreasonable
by DC standards.
Demands
for progressivity
would
be satisfied
since the surtax
would
reflect the progressivity
of the DC rate structure. Another
advantage of the surtax is that
the LDC need not grant a credit for DC taxes or
design some other relief mechanism.41

B. US tax measures
1. A tax on PTKs. In one version of his proposal, Bhagwati
suggests that the host DCs
should levy a special tax on PTKs and remit the
proceeds
to the LDCs of origin. Whether
a

special US tax on PTKs would be constitutional
is not clear. With respect to state legislation, the
US Supreme Court has recently gone very far in
striking down statutes that discriminate
against
aliens.42 The Court has recognized
that aliens
as a class constitute
a discrete
and insular
minority
for which
a heightened
degree of
judicial
protection
is appropriate.43
Accordingly, the burden of proof placed on a state to
justify discrimination
is extremely heavy.
If the Court
were to adopt
the same
standard
in reviewing
federal
legislation,
it
would probably
find a special tax on PTKs
unconstitutional.
The constitutional
provision
relevant to state legislation
is different,
however, from that relevant to federal legislation.44
The same test may therefore not be required in
determining
the constitutionality
of a special
tax on PTKs. Furthermore,
in comparison
with
statutes,
federal
state
statutes
contain
numerous
examples
of discrimination
against

39. See Part A (3) supra.
40. Since the DC tax applies to all of the PTK’s
income, an adjustment would be required if it were
desired to limit the surtax to just the l7K’s earned
income.

41. The surtax could incorporate various refinements.
For example, a floor could be provided so that a PTK
who paid little DC tax as a result of taking advantage
of what the LDC viewed as tax loopholes would nonetheless pay a minimum tax to the LDC. At the other
extreme,
a ceiling could be provided to reduce hard-

ship.
42. Graham v. Richardson,
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
Griffiths, 413 US 717 (1973).
43.

Graham v. Richardson,

403 US 365 (1971);
US 634 (1973); In re

403 US 365, 372 (1971).

44. The fourteenth
amendment
is applicable
to state
legislation:
‘[N] or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property,
without
due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the
equal protection
of the laws.’ The fifth amendment
is
applicable
to federal legislation:
‘No person shall . .
be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due
process of law. . . .’ State legislation
discriminating
against aliens has been invalidated
primarily
on the
basis of the equal protection
clause found in the
fourteenth
amendment
but missing from the fifth
amendment.
But see Boiling v. Sha-ve, 347 US 497,
499 (1954) (discrimination
by the federal government
‘may be so unjustifiable
as to be viola&e
of due
process’).

THE BRAIN

DRAIN:

A TAX ANALYSIS

OF THE BHAGWATI

PROPOSAL

761

aliens.45 The Court might be wary of adopting
an approach
that would
perhaps
invalidate
many of these federal statutes.
Finally, Congress’s plenary
power to control and regulate
immigration
may limit the rights of aliens to
challenge federal legislation.46
Two important
aspects of a US tax on PTKs
may be of overriding
importance,
however.
First, the primary purpose of the tax would be
to protect
the interests
of the LDCs, whereas
the discrimination
in existing federal statutes is
arguably
in the
interests
of US national
security.47
Second, the tax may put the PTK at
a social or economic
disadvantage
in comparison
to a US citizen
receiving
the same
salary;
his chances
of obtaining
adequate
housing and education,
for example, would be
reduced because his after-tax earnings would be
lower. These differences
could be enough to
render the tax unconsitutional,
regardless of the
approach
taken
by the Supreme
Court in
reviewing federal legislation.
More guidance in
this area will be forthcoming
because
the
Supreme
Court is currently
considering
two
cases in which federal statutes
discriminating
against aliens were successfully
challenged
in
the lower courts.48
Even if the legality of a US tax on PTKs
were beyond question,
it is extremely
doubtful
that Congress would enact such a tax. With no
direct interests
of the United States at stake,
Congress is not likely to entertain
a measure
having such serious social and political
overtones.49
Yet without
the participation
of the
United States, no country competing
with it for
PTKs could risk implementing
the tax.

in large sums being made available over time.
Indeed, efforts to persuade an emigrant PTK to
make funds available to his LDC or to LDCs in
general, might be increased
the longer he was
abroad,
and the higher his income
level. A
further
advantage
of the tax incentive
for
charitable
contributions
is that it gives the PTK
no reason to renounce his LDC citizenship.

2. Charitable
contributions.
An approach
available in the United States, though probably
not in most other DCs, relies on the use of a tax
incentive to encourage charitable contributions.
Under US law, a PTK could receive a tax deduction for donations
to qualifying
UN agencies
and organizations
created under US law which
use their contributions
for charitable
purposes
within the LDCs.50 A major attraction
of this
approach is its lack of compulsion-the
decision
by the emigrant PTK to contribute
funds to his
LDC of origin is an entirely voluntary one.
The more financially
successful the PTK is,
the more he may wish to use charitable contributions
to
express
his
appreciation
for
educational
or other
opportunities
afforded
him by the LDC and to enable the LDC to
provide
similar opportunities
for others.
The
tax savings, which increase as income increases,
in combination
with the moral pressure on the
PTK to make regular contributions,
could result

46. See Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334
US 410 (1948); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
US 698 (1893). See also Travers, op. cit., p. 130.

C. UN measures
1. A tax on emigrant
PTKs.
The United
Nations provides
the best institutional
framework for reaching
agreement
on the proper
balance among the interests
of the DCs, the
LDCs, and the PTKs. It is also the most appropriate forum for resolving conflicts between the
Bhagwati proposal
and international
law. The
imprimatur
of the United Nations will increase
the political and moral attractiveness
of a tax on
PTKs; indeed, effective implementation
of the
Bhagwati proposal is likely to occur only under
UN auspices.
One approach
would
be for the United
Nations to levy its own tax on the earnings of
emigrant PTKs.5 1 The host DCs would act as
45. Patrick Travers, ‘The constitutional
status of state
and
federal
governmental
discrimination
against
resident
aliens’, Harvard International Law Journal,
Vol. 16 (1975)
p. 129. See, e.g., 47 USC 5 310
(1973) (denying aliens the right to hold radio station
licences); 10 USC p 8 3285,5571,8285
(1973) (denying aliens the right to hold regular commissions
as
officers in the US armed forces); 46 USC 0 8 808, 883
(1973) (denying aliens the right to participate
in intracoastal shipping).

47.

Travers,

op. cit., p. 129.

48. Hampton v. Mow Sun
Cir, 1974), cert. granted,
Weinberger v. Diaz, 361 F.
prob. juris. noted, 94 S. Ct.

Wong, 500 F.2d 1031 (9th
94 S. 0.
3067 (1974);
Supp. 1 (S.D. Fla. 1973),
2381 (1974).

49. A special tax on PTKs is also difficult to administer. The problems are identical to those of a UN tax
collected by a DC. See Part C (1) infra.
50. Internal

Revenue

Code of 1954,

0 170.

51. The United Nations
does not possess its own
power of taxation.
The right to tax a PTK would have
to be delegated to it by the host DC or by the LDC.
Neither
the DC nor the LDC could delegate
more
power than it could exercise itself. The legality of a
UN tax on PTKs will therefore
depend on whether
such a tax would be permitted
under the laws of the
DC or the LDC.
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collection
agents and transmit the tax proceeds
to the United Nations. A UN tax has a number
of advantages.
It would relieve the inequities
and hardships
that might result if each LDC
levied its own tax on emigrant
PTKs. The
replacement
of numerous
LDC taxes with a
single UN tax would
contribute
to administrative simplicity.
By co-ordinating
the collection of the tax, the United Nations would allay
fears that some DCs were purposely not enforcing the tax in order to attract immigrant PTKs.
The United Nations is also in the best position
to develop
rules for taxing PTKs who have
surrendered
their citizenship.
The UN tax could take the form of a surtax,
for reasons similar to those discussed in Part A
(5) above. At first glance, a surtax appears
simple to administer
since it is based on the DC
tax. In many respects,
however,
the administration
of a surtax applicable
only to PTKs,
rather than to all taxpayers,
is equivalent to the
administration
of an entirely separate tax. The
tax administration
must (1) prepare special tax
forms; (2) compile the roll of taxpayers subject
to the tax; (3) design special withholding
tables;
(4) develop current
payment
programmes
for
the self-employed
and other
taxpayers
not
subject
to withholding;
(5) plan taxpayer
information
programmes,
including
the preparation
of descriptive
pamphlets
and mass
education
programmes
concerning
filing
requirements;
(6) write regulations
and rulings
to answer ambiguities
in the taxing statute; and
(7) train officials to answer questions from taxpayers and to deal with disputes
on appeal.
Most of these problems are manageable,52
but
they must be thought
through in a new context.
For example,
take the problem
of the
establishment
and maintenance
of the tax roll
for a surtax on PTKs. Some mechanism
must be
developed
so that both the tax administration
and employer
withholding
agents can easily
separate PTKs from other taxpayers.
To expect
the PTKs to identify themselves
without some
effective
enforcement
machinery
is unrealistic.
Employers
will make the appropriate
inquiries
only under pressure of penalties.
An approach
with promise appears to be for the tax administration
to obtain
the information
from the
immigration
bureau.
For the immigration
bureau to establish procedures
for identifying
newly entering
PTKs
wouId not be a major problem.5 3 The information compiled by the bureau could be passed to
the tax administration
and entered into its computers. Computerization
seems essential to the
effective use of such information.

At the time of entry of the PTK, the immigration bureau will be unable to obtain two
pieces
of information
which
are extremely
valuable: the current address in the DC of each
PTK and his taxpayer
identification
number.
The identification
number
is critical in computerized
operations;
without it, correlating the
information
from the immigration
bureau with
the tax returns
being filed would be nearly
impossible.
In some countries,
the immigration
bureau might be able to obtain the taxpayer
identification
number
of the PTK sometime
after his arrival, especially
if all aliens were
required to register annually.
If the tax administration
is capable of identifying the PTKs, it would be able to send each
of them a copy of the special tax form. The
PTK could also be required
to inform
his
employer
of his status for withholding
purposes. His failure to inform his employer would
be detected
by the computer
at the time of
filing and could subject the delinquent
PTK to
fines or other penalties..A
system of directly
notifying
employers
of the PTK status of their
employees
may be feasible in some countries.
2. An assessment
on host DCs. Under an
appropriate
grant
of authority,
the United
Nations could be given the power to levy an
assessment
on host DCs. The .assessment would
recognize the benefits accruing to the host DCs
from the immigration
of persons whose talents
are in short supply in all countries. The prweeds
would be earmarked
for use in the LDCs, so
that
they
might
be compensated,
at least
partially,
for the professional
and technical
skills lost through emigration
and for the funds
spent in educating emigrant PTKs.54
The assessment
could be a function
of the
number
of PTKs who immigrated
to the DC,
the amount .of their income, the amount of tax
they paid to the DC, the need for their skills in
52. Somewhat analogous problems are encountered in
the United States when a state decides for the first
time to adopt a personal income tax.
53. Obtaining the names of F’TKs already in the
country, however, would be difficult, since whatever
information was in the bureau’s files would not be
current or organized in a readily usable form. The
bureau could, of course, change its procedures long
before the UN tax became operational. Furthermore,
the UN tax could be applied prospectively, thus
excluding PTKs already in the country.
54. A host DC is obviously free to adopt a foreign aid
programme based on these principles without the
participation of other DCs or of the United Nations.
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the LDCs of origin, or some other combination
of factors that would reflect the costs and problems of specific LDCs as well as the benefits
obtained
by the DCs. The administrative
problems posed by a UN assessment
on host DCs
are modest
in comparison
with
those
encountered
in levying a tax on individual PTKs.
Some
measure
of the income
of PTKs is
necessary
in order to compute
their contribution to the host DC. Only aggregate data is
needed, however, and such information
can be
obtained
from
sample
surveys
and
crossstudies,
which
are
sectional
updated
periodically.
The need for annual assessment
and collection
of tax from individual
PTKs is
obviated.

III. CONCLUSIONS
Of the three approaches
examined,
the least
feasible appears to be a special DC tax on the
earnings of emigrant PTKs. In the US context,
such a tax would encounter
serious political
opposition
and constitutional
barriers.
An LDC tax on all non-resident
citizens
would
be compatible
with existing jurisdictional concepts
of taxation,
but the problems
of enforcement
are formidable.
Each LDC will
have to evaluate whether it can achieve the level
of enforcement
necessary to implement
the tax.
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The factors to be considered
in making this
evaluation
are: (I) the over-all efficiency of the
LDC’s tax administration;
(2) the LDC’s prior
experience
with taxing foreign income; (3) the
existing
level of taxpayer
morality;
(4) the
social and economic
conditions
that generated
PTK emigration;
(5) the LDC’s access to the
assets of emigrant PTKs; (6) possible renunciation of citizenship
by PTKs in order to avoid
the tax; and (7) the host DC’s attitude toward
assisting in the collection of foreign taxes. Most
LDCs will require substantial
assistance
from
the host DCs in administering
the tax; yet little
precedent
exists
for such widespread
intergovernmental
cooperation.
The United Nations appears to be the only
institution
that can provide a suitable framework for designing and implementing
a tax on
PTK earnings.
The collection
of a UN tax
would, however, require a serious commitment
on the part of the DCs. Numerous changes in
existing
administrative
practices
would
be
involved,
and the costs
of instituting
the
necessary
machinery
and procedures
would be
substantial.
These
costs would
have to be
estimated
and compared
with
the revenue
potential
of the tax. Only then could it be
determined
whether
the support
of the DCs
might be more productively
channelled m some
other direction
in order to attain the objectives
sought by the Bhagwati proposal.

